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  The corporate income tax generates a distortion by double taxing corporate income.  In 
other words, corporations typically pay income tax on income earned at the corporate level and 
then shareholders pay personal income tax upon the income when it is distributed to them.  The 
fact that the taxation of corporate income generally exceeds that of personal income raises the 
question of how distortionary the corporate income tax is—the magnitude of the deadweight loss 
(DWL) of the corporate income tax.   
The issue is central to standard work on the subject such as Harberger (1966), Shoven 
(1976) or Ballard et al. (1985).  In these models, some sectors (e.g., manufacturing) are assumed 
to be corporate sectors and other sectors to be non-corporate.  A tax on the corporate sector will 
lead to shifting to other sectors and this generates a deadweight loss (DWL).  The models are 
then simulated in computable general equilibrium models and tend to suggest relatively small 
efficiency costs—less than 20 percent of the revenue generated. 
  A more recent literature has sought to consider the efficiency costs of the corporate 
income tax in a different setting.  In particular, Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1988; 1989; 1993) point 
out that there can be both corporate and noncorporate production in the same sector.  Taxing 
corporate income may lead to much more shifting within sector between organizational forms 
than across different sectors.  Using such a model they predict an extremely large DWL from the 
corporate income tax, frequently in excess of 100 percent of the revenue generated.  The key 
determinant of the DWL in these models is how much firms in the same industry shift to non-
corporate forms in response to the corporate income tax and this is an empirically testable idea. 
  In principle, it should be possible to estimate the efficiency loss from the corporate 
income tax by examining how much a corporate tax increase induces firms to shift out of  
corporate form.  This is the subject of Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990; 1994; 1997) and 
Goolsbee (1998) specifically.  It is also implicit in the large literature on how corporate taxes 
affect organizational form decisions such as Ayers et al. (1996), Carroll and Joulfaian (1997), 
Gentry (1994), Fullerton and Rogers (1993), Scholes and Wolfson (1990; 1991; 1992), and 
Plesko (1995; 1997).  The results in Gordon and Mackie-Mason and in Goolsbee indicate that 
across different time periods, there does not seem to be much shifting in response to tax rates, 
suggesting that the DWL of the corporate income tax is relatively modest overall. (i.e., low 
shifting implies low distortions). 
  An underlying empirical problem in much of this literature comes from data constraints.  
Variation in corporate tax rates over the past 30 years has been almost.  Further, the standard 
approach has been to look at time-series type regressions, typically at a highly aggregated level, 
though sometimes with a limited panel of firm level data.  The problem is that when the 
corporate tax rate changes, such as in 1986, many other aspects of the tax code change, as well, 
making it difficult to be sure that one is picking up the effect of tax rates.  
This paper turns to a new data source to identify the impact of the corporate income tax 
using cross-sectional variation in corporate tax rates in order to avoid the typical problems of the 
time-series based literature.  It does this by looking at variations in corporate income taxes across 
states and combining that with unpublished data from the Department of the Census on the 
organizational form by 3 and 4 digit SIC code in the retail trade sector across states in 1992.   
Although the census data have some problems that traditional tax data do not have, and 
although there the impact of state and federal corporate income taxes may differ (since firms 
have an easier time moving to different jurisdictions to avoid state taxes, for example) this cross-
sectional approach allows for a direct estimate of the impact of tax rates on corporate incentives  
to incorporate while controlling for aggregate factors.  As a further matter, there is considerable 
interest in the subject of state corporate income taxes themselves. 
  This paper will examine the impact of corporate income taxes on firms' choice of 
organizational form decisions and the implied efficiency cost of the corporate income tax in 5 
sections.  Section 2 gives an overview of the way taxes may affect the organizational form 
choice and presents a simple model deriving the relative tax term.  Section 3 summarizes the 
specification estimated in the paper and the data used.  Section 4 presents the regression results.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of organizational form choices 
A. Institutional Background 
  An enterprise that conducts business does not have to declare itself to be a corporation 
and thus can avoid any double taxation.  The firm can be organized as a sole proprietorship or as 
a partnership in which case any income earned will flow through to the partners' or proprietor's 
individual income tax.  Although this type of flow through entity would appear to have a tax 
advantage for most types of business entities, there are important non-tax factors that lead most 
business assets to end up in corporate form.  The two most important are limited liability and 
access to capital markets.  The investors and managers of corporations do not risk their 
individual assets or income when they take part in a firm.  They are only liable for the amount 
that they have invested in the company.  Corporations also have the right to trade on organized 
exchanges and typically have easier access to both debt and equity.  Discussion of other non-tax 
factors relating to organizational form choices can be found in Guenther (1992) or Scholes et al 
(2002).  
  It is important to note some exceptions to this simple dichotomy of form choice.  The 
first is that within the corporate sector, starting in 1958, certain firms could become S 
corporations (as opposed to the traditional C corporations).  Income from S corporations are flow 
through entities like traditional partnerships, eliminating the double taxation without losing the 
limited liability.  S corporations limit the number of shareholders to .  More details on the 
comparison of S and C corporations can be found in Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1997).  Recent 
years have seen a considerable expansion in hybrid organizational forms such as the Limited 
Liability Partnership, etc. which somewhat blur the lines between forms.  At the time of this 
sample (1992), all such forms other than S corporations were rare or non-existant and, as I will 
indicate below, S corporations were not especially numerous in the retail sector. 
  
B. A Simple Theory of Organizational Form 
The stylized model of a firm's decision about whether to incorporate here follows the 
work of Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994) with some extensions.  Assume, for simplicity, that 
the income generated by a firm, Y, is the same regardless of organization type and that there is 
some relative non-tax benefit G associated with being a corporation which is itself a function of 
firm characteristics, x.  The non-tax benefit is assumed to be non-taxable (e.g., something like 
the value of limited liability).  The after-tax income from operating as a corporation each period 
is then 




C C t t t Y x G I - - - + =   
where 
ST
C t is the state corporate income tax rate, 
F
C t  is the federal corporate income tax rate and te  
is the tax rate on equity income.1  That is, a firm gets G plus income net of corporate and equity 
taxes and the state tax is deductible from the federal.
2   
The after tax income from a noncorporate firm is then 




P NC t t Y I - - = . 
where 
ST
P t is the state personal income tax rate facing the marginal investor and 
F
P t is the federal 
personal income tax rate facing the marginal investor.  In words, a noncorporate firm gets no G 
but pays only personal income taxes on the income.  
Clearly, the firm will prefer the corporate form whenever  
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In the case where the effective rate of taxation on equity is zero, all that matters is the 
relative taxation of corporate versus personal income.  The model illustrates that the key tax 
determinant of the decision of whether to incorporate is the relative taxation of corporate versus 
personal income.  While each of these tax components can, to some degree, be measured, the 
sign of the relationship depends on whether taxable income is greater than zero and this fact that 
                                                 
1 I will exclude discussion of the payroll tax whose method of payment differs for corporations versus 
partnerships/proprietorships but whose total burden is equal. 
2 This is sufficient for almost all states.  In five small states, however, at the time of the sample—Alabama, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maryland, and North Dakota—the previous year's federal taxes are also deductible from the state taxes.  I 
account for this in the empirical work.   
is not observed in the census data.  I will have to use proxies for profitability to examine whether 
this prediction is born out in the data. 
This model is most relevant for small, entrepreneurial type firms.  In particular, it is not a 
good approximation for multi-state firms.  When a firm conducts business in multiple states, its 
marginal tax rate becomes a weighted average of tax rates in all the states it does business in 
according to the apportionment formula (see Gordon & Wilson, 1986; Goolsbee and Maydew, 
2000).  The evidence will, indeed, show that the empirical model fits much better in industries 
with a small number of establishments per firm. 
 
3. Data  
A. Specification 
  The basic regression of the paper will explain the corporate share of industry activity Y, 
say employment or revenue, for state s and industry i according to  
is s is s i Total
is
Corporate
is Z X TAX
Y
Y
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where TAX is the measure of the relative taxation of corporate income from the model 
above, ) ~ ) ~ 1 ( ~ ( P e C C t t t t - - + , X is a vector if state-industry characteristics that may influence the 




B. Data on Organizational Form Across States and Industries 
                                                 
3 The right hand side share variable is censored at 0 and 1 in a few cases (1-3 percent or the state-industries).  In the 
results below I will use the linear regression model for simplicity, especially in dealing with the fixed effects.  I have 
checked the results but using a Tobit estimator with censoring at 0 and 1 and the results were virtually identical.  
  The data on organizational form come from the Census of Retail Trade for 1992.  This 
economic census is conducted every five years and is meant to provide comprehensive coverage 
of the sector.  Retail trade, being primarily a non-tradeable, may not be representative of other 
sectors of the economy.  It may, for example, be more sensitive to organizational form decisions 
than other industries are (for those industries, it is easier to change the location of production).  
That said, retail trade is an enormous sector on its own accord.  In 1992, total sales in the retail 
trade sectors included in this sample exceeded $1.7 Trillion and employment was almost 17.5 
million.  This was divided between 8 broad classes of retail trade as shown in table 1.  According 
to the BEA, in 1992 retail trade made up almost 9 percent of national GDP and the BLS reports 
that it employed about 16.5 percent of the nation's workforce. 
  The census of retail trade asks firms about their organizational form.  The choices are 
corporate, partnership, sole proprietorship, and other.  I will use the sum of all the non-corporate 
categories as the non-corporate share.  One drawback of the Census data compared to tax return 
data is that the Census does not distinguish any of the hybrid organizational forms, most 
importantly, it does not differentiate S corporations from C corporations.  The S corps are flow 
through entities so changes to the relative tax term may lead businesses to shift from C to S 
corporations in response to the tax but this will not show up as a change in the Census data since 
the firm will remain a corporation in both cases.  This will no doubt bias the estimated impact of 
taxes on organizational form choices toward zero in the current sample.  It is not possible to 
determine how important a factor this is because there is no publicly available information on the 
share of S corporations by state.  The Statistics of income for 1992 for the entire nation, 
however, shows that the share of corporate returns in the wholesale and retail trade sector that 
are S corporations is about 20 percent.  The share of total revenues in the corporate sector from S  
corporations is about 5 percent.  On average, then, the misclassification of corporations is 
relatively small, though they may be more sensitive on the margin than are other corporations. 
  Similarly, there is no income information in the data because it is establishment based 
and income is fundamentally a firm-level concept.  This will prevent all but the most crude proxy 
for the differential responses of gain versus loss firms. 
  I received a special tabulation from the Census Bureau for each reported SIC code and 
each variable (employment, payroll, sales, firms, establishments) the totals by organizational 
form type.  I will use the corporate share of the industry total as the dependent variable in the 
regressions.  These special tabulations are subject to non-disclosure requirements meaning that 
the Census does not reveal information that could be used to learn about specific companies.  So, 
for example, SIC code 5943, Stationery Stores is missing information on employment and sales 
in several smaller states.  The missing observations are concentrated among the small states and 
the small industries, of course.  In the 76 industries 3-digit industries, of the 1900 possible 
industry-state combinations, 15 have data on the number of corporate firms and establishments 
withheld for disclosure reasons.  More of the employment, payroll and sales observations are 
withheld with about 210 of the 1900 possible observations missing for the corporate sector in 
these areas.   
  The data include information on the SIC codes listed in the Appendix table.  I will mainly 
focus on the 3 digit SIC code level, though I will also present some results at the 2- and the 4-
digit level.  At lower levels of aggregation, not all the industries are covered.  One of the big 
advantages of looking at the retail trade data is that there are many industries with a great deal of 
non-corporate activity, unlike manufacturing and some other prominent sectors.  There is also a 
great deal of variation in the corporate share.  
 
B. Data on Taxes and Other Control Variables   
The components of the tax term are computed as follows: the combined federal and state 
tax on personal income for the  marginal investor is the highest marginal rate in the state, 
combining federal and state taxation, as computed by the NBER TAXSIM for the year 1992 as 
reported in NBER (2002).  For the corporate rate, I use the information in the Book of the States 
(1994)  as well as Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (ACIR, 1994) and compute the 
highest corporate marginal rate in the state, taking account of the deductibility of state taxes from 
the federal and the reverse in the relevant states.  Michigan does not have conventional corporate 
income tax so I exclude it from the results.   
The model above seems to outline the decision of the organizational choice of a small 
entrepreneur.  For such a person, the tax on equity is different than for a larger company.  Since 
small firms are unlikely to pay any dividends, however, and because there are several aspects of 
capital gains that are highly favorable to small entrepreneurs (greater deductibility of losses from 
ordinary income, for example), it it probably more accurate to assume the tax rate on equity is 
zero.  I will do that here.  Results were similar assuming equity taxation at the highest state 
capital gains rate, discounted for delayed realization as in Feldstein et al. (1983), instead, as 
demonstrated in an earlier version of this paper (Goolsbee, 2002).  
Figure 1 plots  C t ~ for each state on the y-axis and  P t ~  on the x-axis.  The difference 
between the two is the tax term so states well above the 45 degree line like Alaska, Pennsylvania 
and Connecticut tax corporate income relatively heavily compared with personal income and  
places closer to or actually below the 45 degree line like South Carolina, Kansas and Vermont 
tax corporate income relatively lightly.4 
Industry characteristics that might influence the probability of incorporation (through, 
say, increasing the value of limited liability or access to capital markets) might be average firm 
size, pay, number of establishments per firm and the like.  To keep things as general as possible, 
I will include the log of total industry sales, employment, payroll, number of firms and number 
of establishments.  I tried including various ratios such as population density, sales per firm and 
so on, instead of the logs and the results were the same.  Note that because there are dummies for 
every SIC code, the specifications fully account for any industry level variation in non-tax 
reasons for incorporation.      
There may also be state characteristics that might influence the probability of 
incorporation in all industries.  It is impossible to include state dummies since the tax rate does 
not vary across industries but I will include information on the log of the Gross State Product in 
the state in the year of the sample (1992) and the previous year (1991) from the BEA, the log of 
the land area and the log of population in the state from the U.S. Statistical Abstract and the 
share of the state population born outside the state (either domestic or foreign born) and the share 
of the people born in the state that are still living in the state both at the time of the 1990 census, 
calculated from U.S. Department of the Census (2002) as well as the share of the state that is 
rural.  The view is that state income levels or growth rates, concentration of population, tax 
competition pressures from neighboring states or a higher transient/new population all might 
influence the probability of incorporation.  I also include the share of the state that has some 
                                                 
4 .  The regressions will take these tax rates as exogenous.  Though I do not have information about how the state 
tax rates were determined, I did try including other types of taxes which might be correlated with the unobserved 
business climate in the state such as the sales tax rate and generally did not find that it changed the results presented. 
  
college education in the spirit of the theoretical work of Levin and Tadelis (2002).  All of the 
state level data, including the tax rates, summarized in Table 2. 
 
4. Results 
A. Basic Results  
  Results from the basic specification explaining the corporate share of firms, 
establishments, employment, payroll, and sales in a given industry in a given state as a function 
of the relative tax term and the other control variables are reported in table 3.  This is for 38 
different industries at the 3-digit SIC code level.  There are SIC code dummies for the industries 
so the coefficients indicate the impact that a state having a higher relative tax on corporations has 
on its share of corporate activity relative to other states in that same industry.  For each of the 
types of economic activity, the coefficient on taxes is negative (and significant for all but one) 
indicating that increasing the relative burden on corporations reduces the corporate share of 
activity. 
  The coefficient on firms indicates that every .01 rise in the corporate income tax reduces 
the corporate share of firms by .006.   Interestingly, the results indicate that the share of firms 
responds much more to the tax term than does the share of establishments.  Similarly, the share 
of employment, payroll and sales responds negatively, as well, but by less than does the number 
of firms (this is especially true considering that the corporate share is higher for these variables 
than for the number of firms).  The number of firms may be more responsive than other 
categories because state corporate tax rates are frequently progressive and a small firm can 
remain in the lower marginal tax rate by simply starting a new firm rather than by growing.    
The magnitudes of the tax coefficients are not precisely comparable to the effects 
estimated in the literature by Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994; 1997) or Goolsbee (1998) 
because those papers dealt with the corporate share of capital or the share of reported income 
whereas these are for the number of firms and establishments and the level of sales, employment 
and payroll.  That said, the coefficients on the tax term here are substantially larger than on the 
same tax term in those papers.  The coefficients of the tax term on the share of industrial activity 
done by corporations here ranges from -.17 to -.60.  The equivalent coefficients in the previous 
literature (on the overall corporate share of capital assets) generally ranged from -.001 to -.15. 
 
B. Robustness 
  Next, in table 4, I examine the results at different levels of aggregation.  For brevity, I 
will look at the corporate share of firms, employment and sales and leave establishments and 
payroll out of the tables.  The results are highly related, just as in the previous table.  At the 2-
digit SIC code level, there is data is available for all of the industries, although there are only 8 
SIC codes so the estimates are not estimated very precisely.  The results, presented in columns 
(1)-(3) show a similar pattern with similar magnitudes but larger standard errors.  For a subset of 
industries, there is more detailed data, i.e., down to the 4-digit SIC code level.  These are 
concentrated only in the 2-digit SIC codes 57, 58 and 59.  Looking at these 30 industries in 
columns (4)-(6) shows even larger effects than the 3-digit results did, especially for the ‘real’ 
factors of employment and sales. 
  In table 5, I deal with the robustness questions that might arise from weighting state-
industries equally despite dramatically varying sizes.  In theory, since the regressions are 
controlling for size of population of the state and the size of the sector, this should not matter but  
there may be differences in the responsiveness for different sized industries.  Columns (1)-(3) 
reestimate the regressions but weight them by state population size.  The coefficients are of 
greater magnitude than before.  Columns (4)-(6) present results from a median regression on the 
same data which again show that the magnitudes are not being driven by a small number of 
outliers or a few small states.  The results here are even more sensitive to tax rates. 
 
C. Explaining Differing Tax Sensitivities 
  Table 6 examines the issue of multi-establishment firms.  Because of the higher 
probability of being multi-state firms (and thereby having tax rates that differ from the tax rates 
in the one state), firms with more establishments should appear less sensitive to state relative tax 
rates than do single establishment firms.  The data do not go down to that level of detail but I can 
divide the observations between industries with average establishments per firm less than 2 and 
those with greater than or equal to 2.  As the number of observations indicate, the majority of 
firms are in the few-establishments group, though there are about 10-15 percent in the multiple 
establishment group.  As predicted, the corporate share of firms, employment and sales is quite 
significantly related to taxation among firms with a low number of establishments.  This is 
presented in columns (1), (3) and (5).  For firms with many establishments, presented in columns 
(2), (4) and (6), there is no significant effect of the tax rate in an individual state and the 
coefficients are much smaller. 
  Table 7 explores two things that ought to influence the tax sensitivity of various state-
industries.  The theory demonstrated that the impact of the tax term should have opposite signs 
for tax loss firms as for tax gain firms.  In the Census data, of course, there is not even 
accounting profit information, much less reported taxable income.  As a proxy, though, I will use  
the ratio of total operating expenses relative to sales.  Total operating expenses include payroll, 
benefits, costs of goods sold, materials and supplies, depreciation, leases, fuel and electricity but 
not capital expenditures.  The payroll information is in the state level census data, the other 
operating expenses come from the national edition of the Census of Retail Trade-Assets and 
Expenditues Series.  Some of those data are given at only the 2-digit level so I assume all SICs in 
the same 2-digit category have the same operating expense ratio in these cases.  The measure of 
total expenses ranges from 71 percent of sales for Department Store Retailers to more than 98 
percent of sales for Radio, Television and Music stores and for Grocery Stores.   
Columns (1)-(3) interact this measure of operating expenses with the relative tax term.  If 
the percent of sales revenue remaining after subtracting total operating expenses is a crude 
measure of profitability then the tax term should be less important in industries with higher 
expense ratios.  In other words, the interaction term should be positive if the measured tax term 
is less important for firms making losses (i.e., with high expense ratios).  The results have the 
correct signs although they are clearly noisy, especially as regards employment and sales. 
  The last 3 columns then explore whether sensitivity to tax rates is related to the physical 
size or to the population of the state.  At the outset, I noted that the sensitivity to state corporate 
income taxes might be greater than to federal income taxes because corporate firms can move 
locations as well as change organizational status in response to local variation.  In small or 
sparsely populated places like Vermont, firms may react very negatively to a tax increase 
whereas in a place like California they may want to remain in the market and as corporations no 
matter what the cost.  To explore this, I interact the tax term with the log of population and the 
log of land area in the state.  For the corporate share of firms in the state-industry, both variables 
matter.  For employment and for sales, only the physical size of the state matters.  In every case,  
the smaller the state, the greater is the sensitivity to relative tax differentials.  The magnitudes are 
quite large.  Take corporate employment.  For a state in the 5th percentile of the size distribution 
(Connecticut), raising the relative tax term by .01 reduces the share of corporate share of firms in 




  Using  new, cross-sectional census data across states and industries in the retail trade 
sector, this paper has shown that the relative taxation of corporate to personal income plays an 
important role in the share of firms, employment and sales that are done by corporations versus 
partnerships and sole proprietorships.  An increase in the corporate tax rate by .10 reduces the 
corporate share of firms by 5-10 percent and the corporate share of sales and employment by 2-6 
percent.  Given the lack of data on S corporations in the census data, this is likely to be an 
underestimate of the true shifting.  This impact of tax rates is an order of magnitude larger than 
previous estimates based on time-series variation in the tax rate and suggests a larger DWL from 
corporate taxation but is still relatively modest. 
    
 
  
Table 1: Census of Retail Summary 
SIC CODE 
 





52: Building Materials & Garden Stores 
% Corporate 
 
53: General Merchandise Stores 
% Corporate 
 
54: Food Stores 
% Corporate 
 
55: Auto Dealers 
% Corporate 
 
56: Apparel and Accessory Stores 
% Corporate 
 
57: Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores 
% Corporate 
 
58: Eating and Drinking Places 
% Corporate 
 












































































Source: Author’s calculations  
Table 2: State Level Data Summary 
   
 
Ln (GSP 1991) 
Ln (GSP 1992) 
GSP Growth 1991 to 1992 
% 1990 Population Born in state 
% Born in the state still there in 1990 
% Rural 
% with Some College Education 
 
Relative Tax Term  
t Corporate (including federal) 
t Personal (including federal) 















Source: Author’s calculations 
  
Table 3: Basic Results-3 Digit SIC Code Level for Corporate Share 













ln (GSP 91) 
ln (GSP 92) 
% Rural 
% Some College 
% Stay in State 
% Born in Stay 
ln (land area) 
ln (population) 
ln (employment) 
ln (# firms) 























































































































      Notes:  The dependent variable is the corporate share of the variable listed at the top of the column.  The 
independent variables are defined in the text.  The standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
  
 
Table 4: Results at Different Levels of Aggregation 
























































































      Notes:  The dependent variable is the corporate share of the variable listed at the top of the column. The first 
three columns use a sample of 2-digit industries.  The last three columns use a sample of 4-digit industries. Each of 
the regressions includes the same 13 covariates that were listed in the regressions of table 3.  The standard errors are 
listed in parentheses. 
  
 
Table 5: Robustness 
























































































Notes:  The dependent variable is the corporate share of the variable listed at the top of the column. The first three 
columns weight observations by state population..  The last three columns use median regressions. Each of the 
regressions includes the same 13 covariates that were listed in the regressions of table 3.  The standard errors are 





Table 6: Tax Sensitivity by Industry’s Average Firm Size 
























































































Notes:  The dependent variable is the corporate share of the variable listed at the top of the column. Columns (1), (3) 
and (5) look at industries where firms have, on average, average fewer than 2 establishments.  Columns (2), (4), and 
(6) show those having greater than or equal to 2.  Each of the regressions includes the same 13 covariates that were 
listed in the regressions of table 3.  The standard errors are listed in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 7: Explaining Tax Sensitivity Across States and Industries 































































































































































Notes:  The dependent variable is the corporate share of the variable listed at the top of the column. The first three 
columns interact the tax term with the expense ratio, as defined in the text.  The last three columns interact the tax 
term with the size of the state in terms of land and population. Each of the regressions includes the same 13 
covariates that were listed in the regressions of table 3.  The standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
  
 APPENDIX TABLE: SIC CODES INCLUDED 
 
2-Digit SIC code regressions  
5200  Building Materials and Garden Supplies Stores 
5300  General Merchandise Stores 
5400  Food Stores 
5500  Automotive Dealers 
5600  Apparel and Accessory Stores 
5700  Furniture and Homefurnishings Stores 
 
3-Digit SIC code regressions 
5210  Lumber & Other Building Mtrls Dealers 
5230  Paint, Glass, and Wallpaper Stores 
5250  Hardware Stores 
5260  Nurseries, Lawn & Garden Stores 
5270  Manufactured (Mobile) Home Dealers 
5310  Department Stores 
5330  Variety Stores 
5390  Misc. General Merchandise Stores 
5410  Grocery Stores 
5420  Meat and Fish (Seafood) Markets 
5430  Fruit and Vegetable Markets 
5440  Candy, Nut, and Confectionery Stores 
5450  Dairy Products Stores 
5460  Retail Bakeries 
5490  Miscellaneous Food Stores 
5510  New and Used Car Dealers 
5520  Used Car Dealers 
5530  Auto and Home Supply Stores 
5540  Gasoline Service Stations 
5550  Boat Dealers 
5560  Recreational Vehicle Dealers 
5570  Motorcycle Dealers 
5590  Automotive Dealers, N. E. C. 
5610  Men's Clothing & Accessory Stores 
5620  Women's Clothing Stores 
5630  Women's Accessory & Specialty Stores 
5640  Children's and Infants' Wear Stores 
5650  Family Clothing Stores 
5660  Shoe Stores 
5690  Misc. Apparel and Accessory Stores 
5720  Household Appliance Stores 
5730  Radio, TV, Computer, & Music Stores 
5910  Drug and Proprietary Stores 
5920  Liquor Stores 
5930  Used Merchandise Stores 
5940  Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores 
5960  Nonstore Retailers 
5980  Fuel Dealers 
 
4- Digit SIC code regressions 
5712  Furniture Stores 
5713  Floor Covering Stores 
5714  Drapery, Curtain, Upholstery Stores 
5719  Miscellaneous Homefurnishings Stores 
5731  Radio, TV, and Electronics Stores 
5734  Computer and Software Stores 
5735  Record and Prerecorded Tape Stores 
5736  Musical Instrument Stores 
5812  Eating Places 
5813  Drinking Places 
5941  Sporting Goods and Bicycle Shops 
5942  Book Stores 
5943  Stationery Stores 
5944  Jewelry Stores 
5945  Hobby, toy, and game shops 
5946  Camera and photographic supply stores 
5947  Gift, novelty, and souvenir shops 
5948  Luggage and leather goods stores 
5949  Sewing, needlework, piece good stores 
5961  Catalog and Mail-Order Houses 
5962  Automatic Merchandising Machine Ops.  
5963  Direct Selling Establishments 
5983  Fuel Oil Dealers 
5984  Liquefied Petroleum Gas Dealers 
5989  Fuel Dealers, N. E. C. 
5992  Florists 
5993  Tobacco Stores and Stands 
5994  News Dealers and Newsstands 
5995  Optical Goods Stores 
5999  Miscellaneous Retail Stores, N.E.C. 
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